More diverse than united? A comparative analysis of the EU elections 2024

The 2024 European elections came amidst a tumultuous political context. Since the last elections in 2019, the EU had to face multiple crises: first the Covid-19 pandemic, triggering economic hardship and recession. From 2022 onwards, Russia’s war in Ukraine put into question stability and security on the European continent. These crises came on top of more systemic challenges, such as the climate crisis and the growing fragmentation and polarisation of societies in EU member states. Finally, the threat of far-right extremism in Europe, linked to the general decline of citizens’ trust in politics, cast doubt on the sustainability of democracy in Europe.

This Final Report of the European Parliament Election Project “More diverse than united? A comparative analysis of the EU elections 2024” – co-lead by the European Policy Centre (EPC) and Das Progressive Zentrum (DPZ) and funded by the Open Society Foundations – dedicates itself to this complex political situation and it’s implications. Together with several European think tanks and research organisations we monitored, compared, and analysed on the basis of a common methodological approach the election campaigns and results in four major member states – France, Germany, Italy, and Poland. We also discussed the aggregated results from an EU-level perspective.

The objective of this project: to create a truly European perspective on the election campaigns and results; provide insights for those who would like to improve and Europeanise the EP electoral processes; and actively contribute to a transnational exchange among think tanks in the EU. 

Key takeaways

• The European election is, in practice, an amalgam of 27 national elections happening simultaneously. The analysis carried out within this research project reveals hugely different interpretations of the outcome.
• The EP election campaigns were significantly different from one country to the other; the results in turn led to widely different political developments.
• The EP election 2024 clearly showed that European elections continue to be second order votes.
• Across all countries, there was a low visibility for genuinely European topics.
• Despite the mostly negative narratives around EU policy-making, no parties explicitly proposed leaving the EU or exiting the Euro. Even the most eurosceptic and anti-European parties, mostly on the far-right, toned down their stance.
• National political figures dominated the debates. Especially in France and Italy, the campaigns were strongly personalised.
• The functioning of the EU institutions was almost always interpreted through a national lens.
• The election campaigns lacked substance in all four countries, the party programmes were little discussed, and even topics with European dimensions were reduced to national level debates.
• The programmes of the Europarties had no connection to national party manifestos, except for the Greens. These Europarty manifestos reflected the EU’s main priorities, such as security and competitiveness. 
• The EU was mostly discussed along the lines of the Eurosceptic or pro-European positions at national level.
• Compared to previous EP elections, the 2024 European elections were mired in political violence, both physical and verbal – a violence fuelled by the far-right, which is increasingly normalised.
• The resentment, anger and disillusionment with politics of growing groups of voters was reflected in the political choices, leading to the success of far-right parties.
• Despite the clear win for far-right parties across France, Germany, Poland and Italy, the European elections also showed interesting developments on the centre-left and the left, with different results across the four countries under study. 
• There were, however, two developments in the 2024 European elections which can be interpreted as positive steps for the EU: The lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat system was upheld; and there was a high electoral turnout with 51% – the highest since 1994, when it reached 56 percent. This can be read as a sign of a more politicised Europe, although not necessarily a more Europeanised one considering the surge of anti-European voices within the EU.

Recommendations

If the next European elections in 2029 are to be more European than in 2024, EU and national decision-makers will have to take several steps in the upcoming mandate. Deduced from the analyses, the report makes four suggestions that are unlikely to will make the European elections “first order”, but that would allow for more European-wide debates and stronger links between the EU institutions and citizens across the EU27.

1. Harmonise EU electoral law
2. Safeguard democratic standards, in particular electoral integrity
3. Hold accountable political actors at national level
4. Develop effective strategies to deal with the far-right

Methodology

The researchers used a joint methodological approach, analysing opinion polls and the election results, interviewing relevant stakeholders, and monitoring the election campaign. The researchers examined the following aspects of the European elections campaigns and results: First, the general political context, both at EU level and in the participating countries; Second, issues and cleavages which were relevant in the election campaigns and in the media; Third, party programmes and messages, as well as political figures, which positions they endorsed and whether they will play an important role in the upcoming mandate; Fourth, attitudes towards the EU and whether the Eurosceptic sentiment increased or decreased; Fifth, voting intentions and then the election result – in particular, which parties and figures did well, if there were significant changes compared to the 2019 European election and compared to the initial polls in 2024; as well as turnout. Lastly, some researchers also looked at the strategic position of countries in the European Parliament, such as how many MEPs countries will be sent to Brussels, and whether certain countries are expected to play a prevalent role in certain EU institutions or on certain EU policy fields. 

The project built on earlier research done by Maria Skóra and Sophie Pornschlegel for the 2019 European elections, which included a comparative analysis of France, Germany and Poland (“The European Election 2019: A Comparative Outlook at the European Election Campaigns in France, Germany and Poland”); as well as the work done by Sophie Pornschlegel and Johannes Greubel in 2021 at the European Policy Centre focusing on the national perspectives on Germany in the EU for the German parliamentary elections of 2021.

Project partners & Reseachers

The project was conducted as a joint cooperation between Das Progressive Zentrum (Berlin, Germany) and the European Policy Centre (Brussels, Belgium). In addition, it includes the following partner organisations: Istituto Affari Internazionali (Italy), Terra Nova (France) and Krytyka Polityczna (Poland), which provide specific expertise to allow for a fuller European perspective.

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