Onwards and Upwards

Delivering on the Promise of Progress

Editorial: Building Bridges to a Better Future

Another Democratic Future is Possible
by Claudia Chwalisz

The Left’s Fatal Longing for Life as Usual
by Paul Mason

The Geography of Discontent
by Andrés Rodríguez-Pose

Edited by Patrick Diamond, Emma Gasster and Florian Ranft
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Hard times call for good friends with a plan. This year, #PGS22 is gathering leading political actors in Berlin to debate and strategise which (and how) progressive alliances can deliver on the promise of progress. Together, we will work on how campaigns, narratives, and policies can build the capacity for progressives to govern at the local to the international level.

We convened this year’s summit with the belief that bringing progressives together to strategize solutions to today’s main challenges is pressing for our planet and social justice.

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Progressive Governance Summit

Building Bridges to a Better Future

Berlin, October 2022

The current geo-political crisis that has erupted on the periphery of Europe is among the most serious to confront the world in the last fifty years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is leading to an upsurge in insecurity: both physical insecurity as the populations of European countries, in particular, feel under unprecedented military threat. And economic insecurity as the conflict exacerbates supply-side constraints, shortages of essential goods, rising inflation, and the soaring cost of living. Ordinary citizens feel the crisis in their pockets as the economic downturn bites, increasing social tension. It would be understandable if people were afflicted by growing pessimism about the future.

The fundamental purpose of red, green and liberal centre-left politics is to demonstrate that we can navigate through the new hard times and that a better world is still possible. Out of the seeds of the current crisis, we can build a more democratic, just and sustainable world if we make the right political choices and decisions now. Even so, we recognise that our societies are in danger as polarisation and populism are on the rise. The long-held assumption that growth and living standards would continue to increase inexorably for working and middle-class households no longer prevails. Progressives cannot merely adopt business-as-usual strategies. They need to think anew. The task is to forge a resilient and durable recovery for post-conflict Europe, a pathway beyond the current geo-political turmoil building bridges to a better future beyond.

The Political Context

The general situation for progressive politics ahead of this year’s Progressive Governance Summit (PGS) is a striking turnaround in the electoral fortunes of centre-left and green parties around the world in recent years. There are notable victories in the United States and a red-green–liberal coalition in Germany; continuing success in Canada, Portugal and Spain; a shift to the Left in Latin America; while 2021 was the first time since the 1950s that social democrats were in power in every Scandinavian country: Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland. And progressive movements are not only winning power nationally. They are invariably dominant in local and city governments in many countries, where they can bring about practical change in the lives of citizens and communities.
Yet there is suspicion that the centre-left is winning against unpopular centre-right incumbents left exhausted and unpopular by the challenges of office. And the most recent elections in Sweden and Italy have proven that the far-right has to be taken more seriously than ever before in recent history. Far-right leaders like Jimmie Åkesson and Giorgia Meloni are even more politically dangerous than a decade ago when right-wing populists were challenging the centre ground. Now they manage to capture parts of it. It is less clear that there is a genuine and decisive swing of the ideological pendulum towards the progressive centre and left. A world convulsed by conflict risks creating an unpropitious climate for centre-left and green politics, reinforcing insularity, narrow individualism, chauvinistic ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies, and an upsurge in right-wing populism.

The Governing Environment

Progressive parties are coming to power in political circumstances of unprecedented adversity. They will have to work hard to keep society together in a governing climate shaped by three inter-related geo-political shocks: the social and economic aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic; the conflict engendered by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine; and the continuing threat posed by catastrophic climate change across the world. Solving any one of these challenges would be difficult enough. Tackling all three together will be extremely tough going. But for progressives, there is not much alternative

War in Ukraine

Putin has brazenly sought to exploit the economic anxieties created by the pandemic and resulting supply-chain shortages. He is now attempting to hold the West to ransom by threatening global energy supplies. The Russian leader is all too aware that the fundamental transformation of the economy and society necessary to tackle climate change and forge a more sustainable future will produce short-term political pain, not least in the form of rising energy prices. It is on that understandable disquiet among western voters that Putin seeks to capitalise. Governments must act to support people and businesses through the current crisis, reinforcing support for liberal democratic values. They should be pragmatic about using the necessary measures: subsidies consumer and SME energy bills in the short term, tackle profiteering by private energy companies and invest in green infrastructure to reduce household and business exposure to rising energy costs. Russia’s barbarous regime and Putin’s actions threaten the foundations of the international security order. They must not be allowed to prevail.

There can be little doubt that the defeat of Putin’s Russia is paramount. In all probability, this will not be a brief conflict. The war may well be protracted, playing out not over days and weeks but months and years. Yet, in the short term, victory will require shared
sacrifice from western populations and the developing world. The most vulnerable in society are often those most affected by rising energy bills in winter, alongside soaring prices for food and fuel. They are willing to pay a price to defend the institutions of liberal democracy and the values of internationalism. But to succeed, progressive leaders need to paint a picture of a better society that will emerge from the current crisis. We need to show people that their sacrifices will be worthwhile.

Progressives are by Nature Optimists, not Pessimists.

We win when we have a bold vision of a better and more hopeful future for our countries, even in circumstances such as today’s when the world is assailed by multiple threats while decades of global progress appear to be going into reverse. We need to show that we can take advantage of the current crisis both to reconstruct Ukraine and to build a new western alliance that brings renewed peace and prosperity to the peoples of Europe, the United States and around the globe.

We argue that a resilient and durable recovery has three core elements: it harnesses societal shifts, acts beyond borders, and forges a revitalised progressive politics.

Harnessing Societal Shifts: Using Structural Changes Underway to Increase Social and Environmental Justice

The Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent aftershocks have shone a spotlight on the inequalities and structural disadvantage that still characterises many of our societies. Progressives will need to continue to revitalise the welfare state while investing to improve the quality of public services and create momentum for more social mobility. The challenge is to continue to support people ‘from the cradle to the grave’: throughout every stage of their lives. The fundamental centre-left insight still applies: economic prosperity and social justice are two sides of the same coin. But today, prosperity needs to be environmentally sustainable and consistent with the transformation required to tackle climate change globally. We know that cities, in particular, will play a critical role in forging a zero-carbon future. Progressives around the world are pioneering new models of urban governance.

The role of new technologies will continue to be paramount. The digital economy and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are crucial for building a more sustainable economy. The task is to equip our populations for the digital revolution ahead. In the wake of the recent populist insurgency, it is crucial to remember that there are still many voters in western countries who perceive technology as a threat rather than an opportunity. We must continue to invest in education and training systems while giving people confidence that technology will help them lead more satisfying lives.
To succeed, progressive parties must build broad alliances for transformation, bringing together key societal stakeholders, notably trade unions and business. The challenge of decarbonising the economy is enormous and requires key actors to work closely with governments.

**Acting Beyond Borders: Building New International Alliances and Global Institutions**

Many of the world’s most pressing problems cannot be solved within the conventional boundaries of the nation-state. Climate change, from pollution to biodiversity loss, can only be tackled by acting together on the international stage. Our global institutions need renewed purpose in the wake of the conflict sparked by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Given the threat posed by Russian belligerence, NATO has had to rediscover its core strategic purpose of defending Europe’s democratic freedom, where necessary mobilising military power. The EU will continue to play a vital role in maintaining support for peace and democracy around the world.

Despite the popular narrative of EU decline encouraged by populist anti-European forces, there is credible evidence that Europe has been rising to new challenges with growing vigour and effectiveness, not least during the recent Covid crisis, from preserving common borders to agreeing to the European recovery programme. A new Europe is possible. But the EU will need to find new partners and allies in a geo-political context that is being reshaped by the war in Ukraine and growing nervousness about the role of China.

**Forging a Revitalised Progressive Politics: Rebuilding Democracy and Creating Narratives and Strategies to Win Elections**

The primary focus for progressives must be to increase trust in our democratic institutions. We have to strengthen the resilience of liberal democracy to counter authoritarian forces, not least by strengthening the capacity to govern and deliver for citizens. Centre-left and green parties must show that reformed government works. We need a cultural shift so that governments serve the needs of citizens, not bureaucracies while providing resilient and modernised infrastructure. Digitalisation will be critical to fashioning a more responsive and empowering state, as will more effective collaboration with a wide variety of non-state actors. Many of the most critical outcomes in public services—from better healthcare to improvements in school attainment—are inevitably co-produced with citizens themselves.

We should not be complacent about the future of western democracy, given the emergence of new threats from anti-democratic, authoritarian forces, including right-wing populism. Democracy has to be defended from the grassroots up, mobilising citizens, grassroots organisations, activists and intellectuals from around the globe. The key is to engage in a continuous process of ‘re-democratisation’, making our public institutions more open, transparent and accountable while massively increasing the scope for public participation and engagement and empowering the next generation to take matters into their own hands.
Towards a New Global Settlement

Whether our politics is red, green or liberal, progressives need to demonstrate that it is possible to build a better world out of the current crises. We need to forge new coalitions and alliances while engaging citizens in an honest, two-way conversation about the difficulties and challenges that lie ahead. Politics isn’t simply about telling voters what they want to hear. It means facing up to dilemmas and trade-offs while being clear that if we make the right political choices and decisions now, we can build a more just and sustainable world.

Our societies are at a turning point. The task ahead for progressives is to create a pathway beyond the current crises, building bridges to a better future beyond.

For Das Progressive Zentrum:

Tobias Dürr
Founding Chairman

Paulina Fröhlich
Deputy Managing Director and Head of Resilient Democracy

Anke Hassel
Advisory Council

Joachim Knodt
Member of the Board of Directors

Michael Miebach
Member of the Board of Directors

Florian Ranft
Member of the Management Board and Head of Green New Deal

Wolfgang Schroeder
Chair of the Board of Directors

Dominic Schwickert
Executive Director

Judith Siller
Second Chair of the Board of Directors
Another Democratic Future is Possible

There has been a recent resurgence of democratic ways of taking decisions. The OECD has called it a “deliberative wave”. Over the past four decades, almost 600 citizens’ assemblies and panels with randomly selected citizens have taken place around the globe at all levels of government.

There have been striking successes: constitutional changes to allow same-sex marriage and abortion in Ireland, critical course corrections on pension policy in Japan, global mobilisation on action on climate change and new permanent assemblies chosen by lot in Paris and Belgium. An incredible wealth of evidence today tells us that everyday people are more than capable of deliberating on complex issues. One key aspect of these citizens’ assemblies is learning and expertise; it is why they require around 40 hours on average. People have the time to hear from experts, hear evidence, question stakeholders, and listen to one another. The collective intelligence of a diverse group of people is able to emerge. And they do the hard work of trying to find common ground on their recommendations.

These examples point to the fact that another democratic system is possible. Elections are not the hallmark of democracy we make them out to be. They are the problem. That is because, as Aristotle and many others have said, elections create oligarchies. Democracy means ‘collective people power’, and for centuries it was
instead associated with sortition, meaning random selection by lottery.

Elections, on the other hand, concentrate power in the hands of an elite few, which is why our current institutions cannot represent the full diversity of society. In a context of multiple crises and climate emergency, elections promote factional interests that prevent us from adequately weighing trade-offs and making difficult decisions or considering nature, the planet, and future generations. The short-termism and the inward-looking logic of politicians and parties exacerbate polarisation and distrust among citizens on the left and right alike.

We are at the beginning of a second “deliberative wave”. The first one has shown us what is possible and what works. But citizens do not want nor deserve to merely have a voice; they also need to have power. We need to move from a phase of citizens’ assemblies being advisory, where it is still up to the political will and the other incentives of party and electoral politics to come back into the picture, to a new phase of citizens’ assemblies having decision-making power. Of course, this requires reflections on accountability mechanisms and the connection to implementation, but these are not unsolvable issues, and it is possible to develop such mechanisms.

Citizens’ assemblies are the classic form of democracy, returning to its definition of ‘collective people power’ and the historical association of democratic forms of governance and sortition. Sortition recognises that everyone has the agency, dignity, and capability of shaping the decisions affecting their lives. They present the greatest hope of another democratic future being possible.

And people are hungry for change. In the Pew Research Center’s December 2021 Global Public Opinion Audit in an Era of Democratic Anxiety, a median of 56% across 17 advanced economies say their political system needs major or complete reform. The 2020 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in France, the UK, the US, and Germany found that, on average, 77% of respondents think it important for governments to create citizens’ assemblies—that is, assemblies of citizens selected by lot to represent the diversity of the larger population—to make recommendations about national laws. The 2020 Sciences Po Political Trust Barometer, covering France, Germany, and the UK, found a majority (55-62%) thinking it would be good to have everyday citizens in charge of public decision-making.

We should be paving the way for a new democratic system and institutions that can unite people and distribute genuine power through sortition; a new democratic paradigm is about citizen participation, representation by lot, and deliberation. After deliberation, direct tools like referenda should also be part of the mix. And it should not be limited to our system of governance; we should aim to democratise the governance of other institutions that impact public life, such as schools, trade unions, companies, cooperatives, tech platforms, and banks.

The current electoral system is broken. Another democratic future is possible. One rooted in history and already proving its worth in the present. With my colleagues at DemocracyNext, we want political systems that channel our collective wisdom and where the priority is to find common ground. We aim to create a more just, joyful, and collaborative future where everyone has meaningful, equal power.

For all references referred to in this article, see the version on our website: progressive-governance.eu.
In the last decade, the European Union has faced multiple shocks, including the Eurozone, climate, and so-called “refugee” crises, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic and the current energy crisis, dramatically intensified by the war on Ukraine. These crises have challenged the economic, cultural, and political foundations of the European project, giving rise to numerous populist and Eurosceptic challenges. At the same time, new manifestations of European solidarity have emerged. The NextGenerationEU recovery fund but also the joint procurement of vaccines are prominent cases in point. While most experts agree that there are good reasons for promoting European integration, including on social issues, hurdles remain. A major challenge consists of the “constraining dissensus”, exerted by a reluctant public opinion. The pitting of national democracy against the European public interest can be particularly troubling when it comes to the issue of European solidarity.

The good news, however, is that solidarity is not a fixed, unmalleable quantity. Rather it emerges through group dynamics and can be strengthened by engaged political actors. The question remains, how to promote European solidarity among the general public? Building on current social science research, we discuss two key ingredients that contribute to building public support for European solidarity, namely blame attribution and reciprocity.

**Blame Attribution: Linking Causes and Solutions**

Solidarity builds on and reproduces social ties between donors and recipients. An extensive literature shows that Europeans’ willingness to share risks and resources with others depends on whether they evaluate the receiving side as “deserving”.

In European politics, Eurosceptic populists tend to fuel in-group versus out-group dichotomies, mostly along nationalist lines. Whereas populists in donor countries tend to blame foreign out-groups for their irresponsible and damaging policy decisions, populists in recipient countries regularly blame other out-groups for exerting structural dominance and thereby causing their misfortune. While blatantly
simplified, such popular blame attribution can exert huge detrimental effects on European solidarity. At least three important “blame targets” matter for citizens’ willingness to support European solidarity. The first concerns the attribution of blame to individuals. Unemployment is a typical example where opposing views about the role of individual agency exist. While some consider the unemployed as victims of external circumstances, others believe that unemployment is the result of a lack of individual effort. Research has shown that individuals show less solidarity with the unemployed if they believe that they do not try hard to find a job, and are consequently more supportive of tougher active labour market policies. Depicting the needy as personally responsible for their precariousness is not only detrimental to national but also European solidarity, as it makes people less likely to embrace joint EU-level efforts to reduce inequality.

Likewise, socially constructed perceptions of government responsibility matter for European solidarity because they affect the perceived deservingness of countries. Our research highlights that Europeans are more willing to support mutual assistance between member states in the event of an environmental rather than a social crisis, even though the harm may be comparable. The key difference here again concerns the attribution of blame, while environmental shocks are arguably beyond human control, governments can be held responsible for economic and financial problems. Such narratives are often shamelessly simplified, as paradigmatically highlighted by the social construction of the “Northern Saints” and “Southern Sinners” dichotomy during the Eurozone crisis. In contrast, the pandemic hit Europe as a natural, external shock for which no country could be blamed. Previously inconceivable measures such as the issuing of joint European debt became suddenly possible.

Europeans increasingly hold the EU accountable for a multitude of problems, including economic conditions, healthcare, and social welfare. In the context of the Eurozone crisis, empirical research covering 10 EU countries shows that substantial shares of the population believe that “EU-imposed” austerity policies worsened social and economic problems in weaker member states (Baute & Pellegata, in press). Such beliefs go hand in hand with stronger demands for EU-level welfare policies targeted at vulnerable groups such as the poor, the unemployed, and disadvantaged children.

Blaming the EU for adverse social outcomes thus may not mean a request for “more Europe” as such, but fosters a demand for EU-level initiatives that have an explicit social purpose and raise the profile of the EU as a provider of – instead of a threat to – social protection. The more citizens attribute the causes of social problems such as poverty and unemployment to the EU, the stronger their demand for compensatory policies on the EU level.

Reciprocity: Linking Donors and Recipients

Reciprocity is another key feature of solidarity. In an insurance system, citizens agree to help each other out, given that everyone contributes their fair share. In the EU, it is states who have contractually—through the European treaties—agreed to contribute to the joint production of common goods. However, to access the fruits of European cooperation, member states bind themselves to commonly agreed norms and values. Trust in reciprocity is of particular importance in the EU because solidarity at an EU-wide scale may evoke
even greater fears of freeriding than domestic redistribution. From this perspective, it makes sense that proposals for European unemployment risk-sharing find more traction among the general public when they are both generous and conditional. In other words, generous unemployment benefits are more likely to be supported if recipients commit themselves to actively look for work, and are sanctioned if they do not.

A key feature of the EU is that it bundles a large number of policy areas. Reciprocal solidarity does not therefore need to be limited to a specific crisis or policy area. The role of benefactor and beneficiary may depend on the problem at hand. Today’s energy crisis, triggered by Russia’s attack on Ukraine, provides a striking example. Germany, traditionally a donor state, now feels the need to ask its fellow EU member states for energy solidarity. This, for the moment rather unpleasant, experience, may strengthen solidarity in the longer run, as it underlines that helping others can pay off for all member states in times of crisis.

In fact, we find that citizens too value reciprocal support across issue areas. If we inform them that a country has previously participated in the admission and relocation of refugees, citizens are more likely to support help during the pandemic. In contrast, if a member state has failed to live up to its European
commitments, for example regarding respect for the rule of law, citizens are less willing to support it in times of need. This logic of reciprocity thus also touches on the disturbing issue of democratic backsliding. In short, our research shows that citizens become more generous to those recipients who contribute to the European collective good and who honour the EU’s community norms.

**Political Narratives, Leadership and Public Support**

Solidarity is nothing fixed. Instead, public support for solidarity is conditional on citizens’ perceptions of a particular crisis, as well as their relationship with those in need. Political leaders spin narratives about solidarity, reciprocity, and blame – and these narratives have significant effects on Europeans’ willingness to share risks and resources with others in the EU.

> "Citizens become more generous to those recipients who contribute to the European collective good and who honour the EU’s community norms."

Advocating for European solidarity therefore can take two forms. First, partisan elites can send a strong signal to their political supporters. Citizens often possess little knowledge of complex issues such as EU redistribution and therefore respond favourably to party cues by adopting the position of their preferred party or trusted leader. Second, beyond one’s own camp, well-reasoned arguments can convince the undecided or reluctant moderates who, despite popular claims about rising polarisation, constitute large parts of national constituencies. It is therefore paramount for politicians to engage in ideational leadership. Those in support of European solidarity must be perseverant in shaping a European discourse that avoids simplified and judgemental narratives about blame. All sides must respect reciprocity and common interests must be stressed, both in donor and recipient states.

While other factors, such as in-group identity and financial costs, also play a role in citizens’ willingness to show European solidarity, these conditions are typically more difficult to change in the short run. By contrast, political leaders can shape public perceptions of blame and reciprocity more easily. By placing these two criteria at the centre of their narratives about European solidarity, they can build public support for a better integrated, and more social, Europe.

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It has been shortened to be accommodated in our reader. For the full version, including all references referred to by the authors, please visit: www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu
On the first day of the Second World War, the poet W. H. Auden winced at the nonchalance of his New York drinking buddies. “Faces along the bar,” he wrote, “Cling to their average day. The lights must never go out. The music must always play”. Those lines have haunted me ever since I left Kyiv, 36 hours before the bombs dropped.

This is the biggest conventional war in Europe since 1945; it has the potential both to go nuclear and to starve the global south; it has fractured the rules-based global order; it may, yet, plunge Europe into cold and darkness. But for many progressives—both politicians and voters—it has seemed a distraction. Urgent, yes. Important, yes. But to be managed like a distant crisis, compartmentalised into diplomatic and humanitarian projects, while we get on with the “average day” of social and economic reform.

We must break from that approach. This is not just a war in Ukraine; it is a war being waged against the collective West, the very concept of international law and the universality of human rights. Until Putin’s aggression is defeated, the conflict should shape every aspect of social-democratic, green and radical leftist politics. And yet, it does not. Across Europe, social-democratic leaders have voted to sanction Russia and provide aid and
arms to Ukraine. But they have done so reluctantly and often openly yearning for a return to “normal”.

The radical left, meanwhile, has split irrevocably. Some, like Li Andersson’s Left Alliance in Finland, made the necessary rapid mind-shifts; embracing NATO membership and the arming of Ukraine. Others, like Sahra Wagenknecht’s wing of Die Linke in Germany, have disgraced the red flag in the same manner as their predecessors in the Weimar Republic. In between, many dedicated activists stay silent, wishing the problem would disappear. As for the Green parties, they too have wavered between resolute internationalism, helpless pacifism and what the Syrian writer Leila Al-Shami has called “the anti-imperialism of idiots”.

The immediate electoral results of these divisions and hesitations have been negative. It does not matter that ruling socialist parties in Sweden, Germany, and Spain did the right thing if—in the wider left and progressive political culture—there is a strong aura of reluctance and confusion over the character of Putin’s regime. Our failure to brace ourselves as socialists and resist Putin enthusiastically—while tolerating a Putinist wing of the left as if our disagreements were over some minor issue—will haunt us unless we overcome it.

Forging New Alliances and State-led Solutions

The first act of coalition building for the left must be a dis-alignment with the inheritors of Stalinism. This is hard to do. In Britain, it has meant the complete cleavage of the movement that put Jeremy Corbyn into Labour’s leadership; a schism within Scottish Nationalism; friendships forged through years of economic struggle suddenly broken. But it has to happen. Because, for those who grasp the seriousness of the threat we face, the route to a progressive political majority—and for a new international order based on law, universalism and cooperation—is clear.

Putin has attacked Ukraine now because he knows that a Russian economic model based on fossil fuel and corruption cannot endure. His invasion has made decarbonisation—regarded as a luxury, or even with hostility by many on the right—vital for the security of Europe. For countries like mine, which chose to denude themselves of industrial capacity and intellectual property, he has made state-led industrial strategy compulsory. And by attacking Western civil society throughout the depth of its political, cultural and information systems, Russia has made it essential that we pursue the socialist objectives of democratic resilience and social cohesion with vigour.

Once we understand this, the modernised social-democratic parties and their allies have a clear route to hegemony. For there is no free-market solution to this crisis, no solution based on narrow nationalism, no solution in the doctrine of the “black zero”.

The moment demands a synthesis of the centre and the left’s objectives: state-led decarbonisation, smart reindustrialisation, mission-based industrial strategy, responsible fiscal expansion, social cohesion and a deepened democracy. To this list, we must add without the slightest reluctance: rearmament.

If we want to deter Putin from spreading his attack beyond Ukraine, we need armies with a decisive technological edge over Russia’s, deeply embedded within the societies they are defending. We need a NATO alliance that lives up to its claims to defend democracy and freedom. If there were any doubt before, these must become social democracy’s explicit goals.
In the mid-1930s, the British Labour leader Clement Attlee, a war veteran, threw aside his own pacifism to demand solidarity with Spain, the rapid rearmament of a country he had called “imperialist”, and an end to its appeasement of Hitler. Attlee led the working class from pacifism to anti-fascism; he isolated and defeated Stalinism; and—even in the depths of the war—he nurtured the design for a post-war United Nations. He remained an idealist in a realist world, and we can learn a lot from the British “Zeitenwende” he achieved.

The coalition we have to build is not simply composed of parties and trade unions. It will be composed of the diverse demographic and political “tribes” of modern society. And it must have a geopolitical dimension. Strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty were, for too long, mere buzzwords within European social democracy. Now, with US democracy fragile and America’s attention focused on the rise of China, we need to concretise them.

Time is short - and Putin’s game plan is clear. He intends to trigger large-scale popular opposition to solidarity with Ukraine through a mixture of scare tactics and energy shortages. His proxies—on the far right and, sadly, in parts of the far left—want to turn discontent over inflation into a mass movement to end sanctions and stop the arms supply. This will not be stopped by appeals to loyalty or bureaucratic suppression. The argument has to be won. The route to economic, social and climate justice in Europe lies through the military defeat of Putin in Ukraine, the moral defeat of his proxies here, and the rapid redistribution of wealth and power downwards.

For us, the danger lies not in the policy space but the mobilisation space. This winter, the place of social democrats, greens, progressive nationalists, and the radical left is on the streets among the masses, not just in the corridors of parliament. If we do not lead them and channel their energy and anger into our political space, the bad actors will.

“This winter, the place of social democrats, greens, progressive nationalists, and the radical left is on the streets among the masses, not just in the corridors of parliament.”

This article is published in cooperation with the New Statesman.
The passing of three major US industrial policy bills is a landmark for climate policy in the United States and the world. With longstanding deadlocks over how to pay for the green transition breached, Marcela Mulholland and Julia Jeanty argue that the next stage of climate politics in both the US and the EU is about making sure that the infrastructure we so critically need is built out at pace.

The recent passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) signals a changing tide in global climate engagement and asserts the US as a leader in climate mitigation. The bill – the single largest climate investment in US history – leverages 369 billion dollars to scale clean energy production, develop climate innovation technologies, create jobs, and reduce pollution in disadvantaged communities. The IRA integrates climate considerations into the bedrock of the US domestic and foreign policy agenda for decades to come, unlocking new investments in durable climate solutions that will have a transformational impact on our global climate system. It also creates space for a new age of global cooperation on climate to emerge, particularly as the implementation of the IRA will begin in the lead-up to COP27.
While the IRA is a significant first step in helping the US meet its climate and energy goals, for it to be effective, we must also pursue new opportunities to scale up clean energy infrastructure, while decarbonising typically carbon-intensive sectors. Doing so means leveraging the policies outlined in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS), and complementing them with regulatory reforms that actually allow the country to build, following the examples of Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, which have been highly successful in scaling their clean energy infrastructure and decarbonising across sectors.

What We’ve Won

Thanks to years of research and development in collaboration with the private sector, the US has been adept at innovating power generation technologies over the past few decades. Where the country falls short, however, is in building out transmission systems to deliver energy where it needs to go, deploying carbon removal technologies at the scale demanded by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to tackle current and past emissions, and scaling our manufacturing capacity to produce climate innovation technologies like solar panels, wind turbines, direct-air-capture hubs, and batteries.

Where IIJA makes critical inroads in restoring dated infrastructure and CHIPS marks a resurgence of industrial policy, IRA sits at the intersection of both, offering incentives for transitioning to a clean energy economy for consumers and companies alike. Investment is just one tranche of the pie, however. To unlock the full potential of these investments, the United States must adapt its regulatory and permitting framework to build out the clean energy infrastructure supercharged by these bills quickly and efficiently.

Constructing a Path Toward Clean Energy

For many years, the US climate movement unified behind our goal of passing federal climate legislation, which we’ve now done. But in the wake of this victory, fissures once brushed under the rug are coming to the fore. In the 1960s and ‘70s, the environmental movement found success aligning itself around what we opposed. It was enough to have a legal and policy strategy solely oriented toward making it harder for industry to do bad things like polluting our air and water. We must now align ourselves around making it easier to build massive amounts of clean energy infrastructure.

We can learn from our partners in Europe about how to build more efficiently. The EU and US face similar challenges to expanding clean energy infrastructure. In both the US and EU, the averaging permitting times for energy projects like solar, offshore wind, and transmission lines can exceed 10 years. The EU, however, is taking notable steps to address this by directing EU member states to identify “renewable go-to areas” where clean energy projects can receive permits within a year; engaging communities early and often in the project development process; and establishing biannual monitoring, reporting, and review protocols for permitting. The US should follow the EU’s lead by expediting the permitting process for clean and renewable energy to make a carbon-free future our reality.

“We must now align ourselves around making it easier to build massive amounts of clean energy infrastructure.”

The Biden Administration’s actions on climate thus far look to tackle these challenges, with the IIJA, CHIPS, and IRA each delivering unique opportunities to decarbonise the US economy across sectors and deliver unprecedented innovations in climate infrastructure and technology.
What the Data Shows

Action on climate change has major electoral implications as well, particularly as the US midterm elections approach. Data for Progress polling shows that the IRA has broad support among the electorate. We even find that nearly two-thirds of voters say they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who supports the bill. Furthermore, the IRA’s climate and clean energy provisions in particular are extremely popular with voters across party lines. Beyond highlighting the popularity of specific climate investments, the messaging of these bills is critical. Our data shows that messages focused on climate change mitigation as a pathway to economic security and short-term economic benefits, like lower energy prices and good jobs, are most effective with voters. Communicating most effectively about climate change is vital to continue building support for climate investments.

A New Era of Climate Politics

The past year of legislative action has led to what some have called a “mini-golden age” of climate policy in the US. It took us decades to get here, but no longer is the US demanding more from others than it is willing to do itself. However, the fight has just begun. We are entering a new era of climate politics, defined not by what we oppose, but by what we build. To ensure the IIJA, CHIPS, and IRA’s full emissions reduction potentials, the climate movement must reckon with what the next phase of climate advocacy looks like. We fought for federal investments and won; now we must actually deploy those dollars to projects and grants across the country. This will require a productive conversation about how to quickly and efficiently build out clean energy infrastructure. We look forward to a new vision for the environmental movement where we continue to improve air and water quality, provide Americans with affordable energy, and do what it takes to decarbonise.

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It has been shortened to be accommodated in our reader. For the full version, including all references referred to by the authors, please visit: www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu
European politics in the autumn of 2022 is overshadowed by the long predicted arrival of the hard right coalition government in Italy, the more abrupt rise of the Sweden Democrats and the European Commission’s constant struggle with the autocratic and increasingly arrogant governments of Hungary and Poland over the rule of law. The most alarming feature of these events is not that the party-political pendulum has swung to the right in Europe, but more and more that, it is swinging towards the extreme right. It’s arrival in office threatens to undermine the stability and legitimacy of national democracies, as well as the cohesion of the European Union.

Orbán and His Gang

His renewed rise was underestimated at first, but Viktor Orbán’s return to government in 2010 was indeed a major turning point for the delicate balance of power in Europe. For much of the international media, he became the black sheep of the EU. But he also inspired some on the centre-right. From 2015 he had an ally in power in Poland, lending him greater weight in international affairs. Together they were able to decisively influence the entire Visegrad group, especially on issues like migration and asylum. At the same time, through extending...
financial networks, Orbán developed alliances to the South of Visegrad, with the likes of right-wing Slovenian politician Janez Jansa, the Bulgarian Boyko Borisov, and the former (and nowadays fugitive) prime minister of North-Macedonia, Nikola Gruevski.

Right-wing populists in the East consolidated a model that facilitates economic convergence without a social dimension. Economic nationalism has served as the glue for the authoritarian program in the region, even if it went hand in hand with allowing multinational companies to enter the manufacturing sectors. Even so, the Eastern European region reported more than half of all Covid-19 deaths registered in Europe before Omicron – despite accounting for just 39 % of the population. This dismal statistic reflects the weakness of health infrastructure and the consequences of a continuous hemorrhage of medical staff.

Importantly, the European Peoples’ Party has provided a cover for Orbán and his followers. Yet events in the region can be viewed as a minor irritation compared to the twin shocks of 2016: the UK vote for Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump in the USA.

The Lasting Effects of the Double Shock

The double shock of 2016 led many to conclude the advent of a populist megatrend, the threat of which simultaneously exercised both a depressing and a positive effect on the EU. The pre-Brexit debates in the UK were far removed from reality, as pro-leave campaigners deliberately exaggerated the costs of membership, particularly in relation to matters such as internal EU migration. On other issues however, such as the transparency and democratic control of EU institutions, leavers pointed to genuine contradictions that had been criticised by others before them. The Brexit process thereby increased the chances of the EU placing greater emphasis on previously neglected (or frustrated) concerns, such as the deepening of the EU’s social dimension. As to the depressing effect, the nationalist and populist tendencies that flared up in the wake of the profound and prolonged global financial crisis were taken by many to signify that further progress in EU integration was impossible since its support among society was lacking (or at least dwindling). This growing uncertainty – and the paralysing effect of the Brexit referendum – was also reflected in the White Paper published by the European Commission in March 2017, which opened a debate over a number of directions including those that might enable the partial dismantling of the EU.

A Social Agenda Against Disintegration Dangers

The financial and economic crises of the period 2008-2013 eroded confidence in the European integration process. This was principally because the EU appeared not to be a force protecting society from financial upheaval, but rather as one endangering livelihoods, local self-determination and social cohesion. As the recovery began, however, sympathy for the EU also returned, and once again the conviction spread that the union needed to be strengthened in order for European countries to prosper. This being said, there can be no strengthening of the EU without expansion of its social dimension.

To build on the 2017 European Pillar of Social Rights, the Commission has launched legislation for decent minimum wages, the transparency of pay (particularly for very high earners) as well as a stable work life balance. The social dimension of broader EU policies like the Green Deal, was well developed, jobs were protected by the SURE scheme at the time of the Covid-19 crisis, the concept of a Health Union gained traction, and a commitment was also made to establish an EU wide unemployment reinsurance mechanism. The cost of living crisis in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war is an additional reason to push for more European solidarity and strengthen safety nets. This can be a new chapter in the history, but it will require Social Democrats to raise their voices more insistently and put forward a distinctive programme that can define the political and policy agenda of Europe for decades to come.
Many thought that the Covid-19 pandemic, with all the disruption and suffering it inflicted, would provide an opportunity to address the acute problems of fallen behind places. As lockdowns spread across the world, the transformation in economy and society altered how we work, relate to others, and live our lives. Almost overnight many started conducting activities remotely and scores of citizens left big cities to avoid the spread of the virus; for homes in the countryside, in the mountains, or by the sea. Housing in many rural areas and remote regions experienced an unprecedented boom, and demand for schools in places that had experienced long-term decline in the public sector skyrocketed.

But the end of the pandemic and the return to relative normality has brought us back to the old routines. Economic growth is again concentrating in what were already the most dynamic places before COVID-19: large urban agglomerations. These large cities often have a concentration of economic and political power. By contrast—except for a few locations outside areas with a track record of attracting investors, entrepreneurs, and skilled workers—most places already falling behind are confronted by a sense of déjá-vu. They have gone back to being forgotten, neglected, and overlooked. In other words, they have returned to the pre-pandemic normal of being “places that don’t matter”; places frequently dismissed as “no-go areas”, “flyover states”, where,
in the infamous words of Hillary Clinton, a “basket of deplorables” lives.

It is therefore no wonder that in post-pandemic Europe the geography of discontent has returned, big time, as a major issue in politics and policy-making. In 2022 anti-system political parties have made significant electoral inroads surfing on the wave of popular discontent in areas left-behind. Marine le Pen has become a serious contender for the French presidency. Viktor Orbán, despite facing a united opposition, led his Fidesz party to the biggest majority ever in democratic Hungary. And more recently, the Sweden Democrats hold the key to the Swedish government, while Giorgia Meloni has become the first post-fascist prime minister in a western European democracy since the end of World War II.

The discontent fuelling these political choices at the ballot box is driven by those who have seen their economies decline over a long period, their best and brightest leave for areas where opportunities are more abundant, and their local public goods and services decay and disappear. Discontent is brewing; fueled by the perception that their plights are being ignored and that public policies and investment are skewed to benefit the already rich and powerful. The belief that they can eventually escape from their disadvantaged situation is ostensibly diminishing by the day. They feel abandoned and are exacting revenge at the ballot box.

These attitudes are not driven by low educational qualifications or changing demography and ageing. Such an interpretation misses the point that many low-skilled and older citizens are stuck in places where opportunities are limited. They have no willingness nor do they have the resources to move elsewhere. This is a problem of territorial neglect, of governments no longer believing in the potential of places that, in many cases, were at the heart of the industrial revolution more than a century ago.

“This is a problem of territorial neglect, of governments no longer believing in the potential of places that, in many cases, were at the heart of the industrial revolution more than a century ago.”

The return of the geography of discontent is radically changing the political arena across the major industrialised economies. Urgent and targeted action is needed to deliver improved well-being for all, before we risk plunging into the situation where leaders who thrive on conflict undermine our collective capacity to address the many global challenges we face.
Joining Forces in Times of Crises

Progressive Politics and Authoritarianism Abroad and at Home

by Anke Hassel and Michael Werz

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the dual challenge for progressives: to embrace a just transition towards sustainability and to push back against increasing authoritarianism. Those who mistrust democratic institutions to begin with will be further alarmed by rising inflation and energy bottlenecks. Authoritarian leaders will use the crisis to deflect from ambitious climate policies. To succeed, progressive politics need to focus on key essentials for joining forces in times of crisis: mobilise a new generation to generate politics for change, strengthen coalitions abroad, delineate the substance of democratic institutions against authoritarianism, and define fair policies for a carbon-free future.

Europe and the United States find themselves in an entirely new geopolitical and social situation. They face interwoven and mutually reinforcing global crises. As a war rages less than two hours by plane from Berlin, these challenges provide the context of the Zeitenwende – a major political turning point.

The End of Business as Usual

High living standards in wealthy countries are based on the extensive use of fossil fuels, land, and raw materials. Fighting climate change and preserving biodiversity will require changing our production models, lifestyles, consumption, and mobility. It requires high investment in new technology and infrastructure and also more respect for the needs of the Global South. The current food crisis is just the latest indicator that business as usual is no longer an option, and the current energy calamity in Europe reveals a glimpse of the future: Living standards that have been taken for granted are threatened if fossil fuel is not freely available and alternatives are lacking. This challenge of transformation comes at a difficult time; there is reason to be concerned about the integrity and viability of major Western democracies with their notions of checks and balances and social balancing. Populism and authoritarianism have considerably damaged our institutions. Even strong democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom have seen blatant abuses of government power, while others have lived through massively declining levels of trust in their institutions. The V-Dem-Institute in Sweden recently documented that we have “experienced the lowest levels of democracy the world has seen in thirty years.” In the U.S., the Trump years have laid bare the limits of the resilience of institutions, traditions, and decision-makers alike. For the first time in recent memory, authoritarian worldviews have successfully established themselves at the center of Western middle classes and can create political majorities. In the recent French presidential election, the far-right candidate came in second once again in the first round and – compared to 2017 – closed the gap with Macron. The recent Swedish and Italian elections have only reinforced the rising threat of the far-right. The dual challenge of transformation and the authoritarian threat force progressives to rethink and reassess their approach and constituencies. It is necessary to focus on new alliances at home and abroad to define a clear future-oriented project. These include a renewed transatlantic partnership.
to lead transformative change that is open to actors in other regions. It must be based on democratic values and address anti-democratic forces domestically and abroad. But it also requires a credible and modern security component. Restoring and protecting democracy in the West (we use this term as normative, not as a regional concept) is fundamental for achieving the transformation towards a sustainable future.

The End of the West as We Know It

During the last three decades, a commercial one-world has formed which penetrates every corner of the earth. This has resulted in structural tensions between border-crossing economies and the limited reach of nation-state power to address current challenges. The new economic world order is liberal and market-driven. It has lifted millions out of poverty but made markets and societies more prone to crises. Therefore, many feel increasingly vulnerable in everyday life: Inequality remains a serious issue and social mobility continues to be low. The financial crisis wiped out savings for millions of citizens, and the pandemic has hurt children, young people, the elderly, and those needing care. In addition, climate change affects communities, and the onset of the war in Ukraine has prompted higher cost-of-living expenses with exploding energy prices and double-digit inflation rates. Rising economic insecurity is part of the explanation but is insufficient to address prospering Western societies’ authoritarian turn. Disenchantment with modernity goes much deeper. Open and diverse societies upset traditional hierarchies and lifestyles. The drive for equal opportunities for women in Western societies threatens the position of men at home and the workplace. Demands by ethnic minorities and migrant communities for better participation and less discrimination undermine dominant social hierarchies in politics and business. In many communities, immigration, equal opportunity but also the acceptance of queer lifestyles is perceived as attacks on their life choices.

During this difficult transition towards more diverse societies, it is vital to recognise how educated and prospering middle classes develop and justify their undemocratic worldviews. In the U.S., Donald Trump’s rhetoric of middle-class victimisation resonates with countless voters, and the Democratic party has struggled to find a successful counterstrategy. To different degrees, Canada and Europe see similar shifts.

The Global Dimension of the Authoritarian Challenge

There is an international dimension to these developments, given the systematic interference by authoritarian elites from Russia or China in Western media, universities, political parties, and elections: Authoritarianism in other regions of the world directly and negatively impacts liberal democracies. Russia’s repeated invasions in Ukraine and the Chinese appeasement of this aggression are a direct result of lacking checks and balances in these societies. The war in Ukraine not only destabilizes European borders and institutions. Russia has also made hunger and starvation weapons of war, de facto taking hostage millions of Africans.

For Europe, and particularly for Germany, there must be no doubt that ‘equidistance’ vis-a-vis Russia and the United States is not a viable path. Despite the many faults of the military intervention in Iraq led by the U.S., the authoritarian nature of China and the unprovoked attack by Russia on Ukraine make comparisons and even attributing the situation to the U.S. unacceptable. In an increasingly multipolar world, a renewed transatlantic alliance provides crucial protection against authoritarianism. The deficits of U.S. foreign policy constitute another reason for actors like Germany or Canada to take on leading roles in an international anti-authoritarian collation. Establishing real power is the prerequisite to addressing militaristic tendencies in U.S. policy and forging a new direction for the transatlantic alliance. The current political moment offers that opportunity. In addition, the necessary public debates to push
back against Russian and Chinese authoritarianism might find more political support than addressing authoritarian worldviews of domestic segments of society without this international context. In other words: Countering the advance of the illiberal energies of China and Russia will help discredit and weaken illiberal forces at home.

Europe must lead in that alliance and not just be a passenger on America's coattails. The EU's drive towards strategic autonomy has indicated some of the necessary steps in the fields of security, trade, and industrial policy. They must be complemented by a firm commitment to Europe's social and political values. Now the task is to modernise the transatlantic partnership to stabilise democracy and facilitate the social and environmental progress our era demands. Areas of engagement range from earnest debates about the nexus of climate change and security to data protection and informational self-determination that deserves its name, to a modern and global migration framework and modern trade policies.

New Alliances at Home and Abroad

To succeed, progressive politics need to form alliances with new generations but also with international allies. The transatlantic partnership is a key component and needs to remain open to all countries who subscribe to liberal values. At the same time, it is necessary to mobilise the aspirations of younger generations, be clear on the essence of a democracy that will be defended and develop a set of strong policies for just transition.

First, the current generational shift in European and U.S. politics offers a significant challenge and a great opportunity. Previously, breakthroughs in the political culture of western societies emerged through new generations: the anti-Vietnam war protests in the U.S. and the 68 rebellions in Western Europe. Younger generations rejected the lifestyles and myths of their parents and forcefully demanded change. Today, environmental and social justice movements speak for a generation whose lives will be less comfortable than their parents. Progressive leaders should embrace their voices and make them part of a future-oriented, enlightened international conversation about democracy, anti-authoritarianism, and social change. However, modernisation is a process from within and cannot be forced from the outside. Liberal and progressive societies should be tolerant of other ways
of life much more than they have been in the past. This includes the increasingly vicious culture wars on language (for instance in the fields of gender or race) or cultural appropriation. Progressives should aim to build bridges between young campaigners for change and those who are rooted in local communities. This is also essential for finding allies in the global South. The West will only succeed in finding allies if it does not impose its societal modernism on more traditional societies. This is easier said than done, given the apparent tension of convincing a new generation to be the vanguard of new domestic force for change and a renewed transatlantic alliance. Considering the widespread antipathy to the United States, a bargain or a social contract is needed; therefore, vital generational issues like environmental or social justice must be part of future transatlantic conversations. However, such an agenda on its own is not sufficient to prevail either domestically or internationally. To make progress on the core issues of a new generation, it is necessary to drive forward a broad alliance with opponents of global authoritarian forces from Australia to Japan and from India to New Zealand to counter China and Russia internationally and their aligned illiberal forces at home.

Secondly, another important element of this new conversation is a focus on the core elements of democratic values. It is necessary to clarify what defines the core principles of the rule of law, in particular the separation of powers, judicial independence, and the freedom of the press, and to have a clear demarcation line of democratic and authoritarian rule. The EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights can serve as a guide in this discussion. It is important to clear the muddied waters of what the red lines of authoritarianism are and when they are crossed. This applies to liberal democracies in the West but even more so to illiberal regimes in Hungary, Russia, China or even more opaque cases like Syria and Iran. This entails an open and well-informed public debate – and here, the concentration of the media industry and the largely unregulated nature of social media is a point of concern. This also includes a push back against authoritarian influences in liberal societies. There have been systematic forms of disinformation by authoritarian regimes in the form of cultural centers (Confucius Institutes) and television programs (Russia Today) which should be monitored closely. Putin’s role in the election of Trump might at times have been overstated but there can be no interference by authoritarian regimes in democratic elections without an aggressive response.

Third, a clear set of principles to facilitate just transition should be developed. To name a few: investments in climate adaptation and decarbonisation are better than paying for damages. The precaution principle, which the EU has carefully developed over the past, should be strengthened. Climate change costs must be distributed based on the polluter pays principle. Radical external shocks through wars, pandemic and financial crises require substantial fiscal responses. People’s incomes, jobs and livelihoods should be the focus of future policies. European solidarity must be a guiding principle, and stronger EU member states must consider the needs and capacity of weaker neighbors.

The Russian invasion in Ukraine has put the value of liberal democracies on the agenda. It serves as a violent reminder of what is at stake. And the upcoming winter will test the commitment of liberal democracies to their core values. This massive political challenge also offers opportunities to move forward that cannot be squandered.
On 12 and 13 October 2022, we are back with this year’s Progressive Governance Summit. This year’s summit is focusing on how to build forward-thinking political coalitions that can lay the foundations to make the 2020s a decade of progress. And winning progressive majorities is more important than ever. After a decade of inequality, planet degradation, threats to liberal democracies by far-right actors, and Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, progressives must stand together, forge strong bonds and deliver sound policies for bold structural reform to leave no person or community behind and secure peace and prosperity in Europe, North America and beyond.

www.progressive-governance.eu
question@progressive-governance.eu

Das Progressive Zentrum is an independent, non-profit think tank founded in 2007, devoted to establishing new networks of progressive actors from different backgrounds and promoting active and effective policies for economic and social progress. It involves especially next generation German and European innovative thinkers and decision-makers in the debates. Its thematic priorities are situated within the four programmes Resilient Democracy, Green New Deal, The Modern State and Political Strategy, with a particular focus on European integration and the transatlantic partnership. The organisation is based in Berlin and also operates in many European countries as well as in the United States.

www.progressives-zentrum.org
mail@progressives-zentrum.org

Twitter: @DPZ_Berlin
LinkedIn: das-progressive-zentrum

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